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Abstract. Technological changes over the past two decades have made it
easier to distribute and to copy intellectual property. Creators and owners of
intellectual property have responded tothese changes with a variety of creative
pricing strategies. The paper reviews some of these pricing innovations. Two
broad categories of innovations are explored: those that facilitate price dis-
crimination and those that exploit complementarities between di¤erent types
of creative works.
Two decades ago, the photocopier, the audiocassette recorder and the videocas-
sette recorder were the relatively new technologies that threatened to change the
market for intellectual property. Economic analysis by Leibowitz (1985), Novos
and Waldman (1984) and Johnson (1985) among others centered on the impact of
these new technologies on consumers and producers and the possibility that the
owners of intellectual property could indirectly appropriate the value created by
their property when copied by someone who did not pay for it. In the intervening
two decades, the digitization of most creative work and the advent of new technolo-
gies for the reproduction and transmission of digital information have, if anything,
intensi…ed the debate. Whole industries, such as the recorded music industry, feel
themselves under attack by copying and distribution of unauthorized editions.
While some of the response to these technological changes is being played out in
the legal arena, owners of intellectual property have alsoresponded with innovations
in pricing. This paper surveys some of those pricing innovations and shows how
they can be interpreted as responses to the new technologies of reproduction and
distribution. This paper does not attempt to assess whether the net e¤ect of the new
technologies on the market for intellectual property has been positive or negative.
However, part of that assessment would have to include the pricing responses of the
owners of intellectual property, responses that cushion the e¤ects of and, in many
ways, take advantage of opportunities presented by the new technologies.
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In my brief overview of pricing innovations, I divide the innovations into two
categories: those that facilitate price discrimination and those that rely on com-
plementarities among versions of creative works. Both of these strategies allow
owners of creative works to capture more revenue and o¤set the revenue dissipation
caused by unauthorized copying. Assuming that sellers of intellectual property do
not undertake self-destructive behavior, these strategies must enhance the …nancial
position of the sellers.
The paper takes no position on the welfare aspects of these pricing strategies. We
are clearly in the world of the second best if not third best. Taking total surplus as
1Shapiro and Varian (1999) present a comprehensive look at pricing strategies for intellectual
property.
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the ultimate goal of economic activity, these pricing strategies might well enhance
welfare, especially if the e¤ect on the supply of creative works is responsive to
economic rewards, but even if it is not.
1. Facilitating Price Discrimination
Information goods with large …xed costs and low marginal costs are especially
suited to price discrimination as long as markets can be separated. Price discrim-
ination is a way to o¤set the revenue dissipation of unauthorized copying. This
section of the paper examines three creative applications of price discrimination to
the market for intellectual property.
1.1. Intertemporal Price Discrimination. Since U.S copyright law prohibits
producers from practicing price discrimination between institutional buyers such as
video rental stores and …nal customers (see Mortimer (2004)), studios practiced in-
tertemporal price discrimination, pricing high at …rst release to capture the surplus
of the rental stores and then reducing the price to attract individual customers.
This, in e¤ect, separates the high value institutional buyers and the lower value
consumer buyers. A high price of media at release essentially restricts its sale to
high value users, the rental stores. Subsequent drops in the price bring direct to
consumer sales. The market is segmented over time between the high value rental
stores and the lower value consumers.
Interestingly, the optimal pricing strategy for a particular movie will depend
on the relative strength of customer demands for rentals as opposed to ownership.
Certain categories of movies, such as children’s movies, are felt to have greater rel-
ative demand for ownership. Price discrimination for those movies is not necessary
because the rental store demand is lower relative to the consumer owner demand.
Also, of interest is the fact that intertemporal price discrimination has been
much less common in the DVD format than it was in the VHS tape format. The
reasons for this are not clear. One possibility, explored by Mortimer (2004), is that
the quality of DVD’s relative to VHS tapes is high enough to enhance the value
to consumers of owning DVD’s enough to eliminate the gain to intertemporal price
discrimination. Recall that it is the ownership value relative to rental value that
dictates price discrimination.
1.2. Revenue sharing contracts – the Blockbuster solution. Given the con-
straint imposed by copyright law, intertemporal price discrimination achieves some
market separation but not a …rst best solution. In this environment, Blockbuster,
a chain of video and DVD rental stores, and other video stores made innovative
revenue sharing agreements with the producers of recorded video entertainment in
the late 1990’s. Before this type of contract, Blockbuster had purchased tapes and
DVDs from the producers to rent to customers at a high initial price designed to
capture some of the surplus from …nal consumers who are willing to pay a high price
to rent a tape or DVD just released. When a movie is …rst released in recorded
form, customer demand for rental is initially very high and typically many cus-
tomers were unable to obtain a rental. Blockbuster could have solved the problem
of insu¢cient supply of recorded media by buying more. However, that solution
would require Blockbuster to invest heavily in an inventory of media that would
rapidly become obsolete as customer demand for that particular release waned over
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it can obtain media to rent is by purchasing them, it was not worth satisfying its
customers’ peak demand for rental at release.
The pricing innovation was to recognize the alternatives to purchase of physical
media. The physical media are just vehicles for digital images, which are the real
object of customer desire. Blockbuster, is, in e¤ect, an intermediary between the
producers of creative works and the customers who want to view them. When the
transaction between the producers and Blockbuster is restricted to a purchase of
physical media, mutually advantageous gains from trade are precluded.
The Blockbuster solution was to replace the purchase of physical media with the
sale of consumer views. Blockbuster was provided with enough physical media to
satisfy consumer peak demand, but the payment to the producers depended on
the number of rentals. In other words, Blockbuster and the producers share the
revenue from consumer rentals. In a way similar to the types of contracts between
producers and movie theaters. As Dana and Spier (2001) have noted, revenue
sharing contracts such as those in the video rental industry, can attain …rst best
solutions under certain market conditions.
This type of contract requires accurate and veri…able monitoring of consumer
rentals by the producers. Blockbuster apparently opened its accounting system to
the producers to allow them to verify consumer rentals and enforce the revenue
sharing contract.
1.3. Broadway theater. A …nal example of price discrimination strategies has
been the emergence of sophisticated price discrimination in the Broadway theater.
Theaters are like airlines with huge …xed costs and negligible short run marginal
costs. A seat unsold is a pure loss. And theater owners have become more like
the airlines in perfecting revenue management strategies that rely on third degree
price discrimination. Just as the airlines rely on a correlation between consumer
valuation and ‡exibility of scheduling, theater owners are reserving seats for high
demanders who want the ‡exibility of being able to make decisions at the last
moment. For example, tourists, for whom the cost of the play is a small part of
the overall cost of their trip, might be high value consumers who also value the
‡exibility of being able to decide at the last minute.
At the same time, theaters attempt to …ll all seats with paying customers by
selling surplus seats at the last minute at lower prices. Obviously, it is crucial to
separate the types of customers. Increasing price discrimination is consistent with
evidence that the variance of prices of tickets actually sold for any particular theater
performance has been rising over time.
2. Complementarities
A second group of pricing strategies attempts to exploit the complementarities
between versions of the creative product. Some of this exploitation is a response
to the technological changes that have allowed consumers to obtain high quality
unauthorized versions of certain creative products at very low cost.
2.1. Live Concert Pricing. Alan Krueger (2005) documents the rapid increase in
the relative price of tickets tolive concerts by popular musical performers since 1996.
His preferred explanation for this rapid rise is that it is a response to the increasing
availability of free-recorded music though peer-to-peer …le sharing over the internet.
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recorded music. Concerts whet the appetite of the audience for recordings, while
at the same time recordings enhance the appeal of live concerts where consumers
can see the performer in person.
When recordings could not be easily copied and shared, concert tours were used
to enhance the demand for recordings. Low ticket prices would ensure exposure of
large numbers of consumers to the live concert that in turn would stimulate sales
of recordings. What Krueger argues is that as the unauthorized distribution of
recordings became widespread, the role of concert and recording essentially ‡ipped.
That is, the “free” recordings are now what increase the demand for live concerts,
so that an increasing share of revenue is made on the concert side of the business.
This explanation has the virtue of being roughly consistent with the timing of the
introduction of …le sharing and its accompanying ease of obtaining unauthorized
copies.
2.2. Author Pays Journal Pricing. Another example of complementarities in
action is the introduction of author pays scholarly journals. Traditionally primarily
the readers have paid for journals, although submission fees and page charges have
contributed to journal revenues. Three forces have led to possible changes in that
institutional framework. One change is the advent of digital technology and the
Internet which have made it possible to “publish” articles and distribute them
electronically at extremely low per user marginal cost. A second change has been
the ability of consumers and producers of scholarly research to exchange articles
without the intermediary of a journal. The third change has been the rise of pro…t-
making scholarly journals and their very high subscription rates.
These changes have led scholars to investigate the possibility of author pays
journals. Bergstrom and Bergstrom (2004) argue that author pays journals are
viable. Part of the reason is the complementarity between article publication and
the value of the author’s reputation. Just as performers may be willing to perform
concerts to enhance the value of their recordings (or vice versa), researchers would
be willing to pay to have their articles published in order to burnish their academic
reputations. With the very low marginal cost per reader implied by paperless
electronic delivery of digital …les, and the easy reproduction of unauthorized copies,
pricing readers is becoming less feasible and less e¢cient. Pricing authors may be
the solution. McCabe and Snyder(2004) show that author pay journals are more
likely to be adopted and to be socially e¢cient the lower the marginal cost of
serving a reader and the greater the bene…t to the author relative to the bene…t to
the reader.
This last ratio explains why author pay is likely to be observed in academic
publications rather than general publications. While nonacademic authors may
obtain some bene…t from exposure in print, the bene…ts of the transaction go mainly
to the reader. So-called vanity presses exist to serve that minority of publications
whose bene…ts go mainly to the author. The complementarity between publication
and the author’s academic reputation imply that author pay journals have the
potential to solve the …nancial and economic problem posed toconventional journals
by electronic publication. Free dissemination of journals to readers when authors
pay for publication solves those problems.
2
2There will be, of course, moral hazard problems when authors pay to publish but these can
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2.3. Free Dissemination of Partial Works. A …nal application of the di¤eren-
tial pricing of complementary goods is the case of free provision of parts of creative
works to stimulate the consumer demand for the whole good, which one could take
as being complementary to the part. As an example, Amazon.com puts sample
pages of books and sample excerpts from recordings it sells on its website for con-
sumers to browse. The part is provided to give consumers better information about
the whole.
Shapiro and Varian describe some other activities along these lines including
providing free searchable indexes to archived articles in many newspaper websites,
but charging to look at the whole article, a strategy that again relies on comple-
mentarities. Musical performers can put a sample of their output on line for free to
encourage sampling by consumers. The capacity of the Internet to support websites
at very low cost probably implies a broadening of the horizontal variety of musical
performance, just as cable television has led to a fracturing of the mass audience
into many specialty audiences. This has led many observers to predict that …le-
sharing and Internet distribution would hurt the most popular performers but help
those who cater to a narrower part of the taste spectrum. In economic terms, there
may be redistribution regardless of the e¤ect on overall welfare. Interestingly, the
same types of technological forces that led Sherwin Rosen(1981) to describe the
high earnings of superstars in the dimension of vertical quality may lead to more
equality of earnings along the dimension of horizontal quality.
3. Conclusion
Digital media and the Internet have transformed the technologicallandscape over
the past twenty years, but the basic lessons of the economic models of copying of
that earlier era are still valid. The e¤ects of copying technology on welfare depend
on the nature of consumer demand and the elasticity of supply of creative works.
Creative pricing can allow producers or upstream sellers to capture some of the
bene…ts of downstream copiers. Those creative pricing behaviors will mute the cost
imposed on producers by new copying and distribution technologies.
An optimist like Lessig (2004) would argue that producers have worried about
unauthorized copying and the competition from new technologies before yet the
markets for creative works broadly de…ned are bigger than ever. The net e¤ect
of technical changes that enable unauthorized copying and distribution will be
impossible to predict ex ante.
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